Reflexionando en torno a lo que Habermas sostiene en el sentido de que toda afirmación entraña una pretensión de validez universal, comencé a pensar en torno a la forma en que hemos convivido como especie en el plano de las relaciones, orígenes y consecuencias del poder. En el plano de la política.
La ignorancia, expresada como término sin carga peyorativa, en un principio dotó de misticismo al acontecer político. En tal virtud, tomaron relevancia los ritos complicados, oráculos, sustancias, piedras, sitios, ofrendas, sacrificios e incluso, tristemente, guerras y muerte. Era lo ultraterreno y los rituales con ellos asociados lo que dotaba de validez a los actos humanos, eran de algún modo lo que Kelsen denominaría, un referente de significado.
El desarrollo no sólo tecnológico sino del liberalismo y el individualismo también, han cambiado de manera radical el paisaje a través del tiempo.
El recurso del mito ante lo inexplicable o ignorado que se justificó en cierto momento y sirvió de base para justificar actos de cara a terceros dejó poco a poco de dar las respuestas a todas las interrogantes planteadas. Así, la secularización parcial y gradualmente fue dando cabida a prácticas que en un principio fueron tachadas de paganas y que hoy por hoy, dan forma a la civilidad y las instituciones democráticas.
¿Nos hemos desprendido entonces del mito? Claro que no. Las cargas rituales de la civilidad no dejan de ser un girón de tela que aún huele a misticismo en forma de trascendentalismo añorante. Y es que la política y el intento de dotarle de contenido, extensión y significado es una tarea política en sí misma. La afirmación política por tanto y con independencia de la arena en que la misma se presente, no ha dejado de pensarse, plantearse e incluso estudiarse como una expresión con pretensión de validez universal porque el lenguaje de lo político así como ciertas prácticas en torno a ello, evidentenmente están dotadas de cargas normativas desde que la gente que las expresa imprime en ellas el sello del lado que han escogido y lo hacen con el afán de prevalecer por encima del otro en el sentido más político de la palabra. El recurso al mito sigue ahí. Lo que es cuestionable es su utilidad en un mundo sin universalidad a la cual aspirar.
En un mundo así, vale más temprano que tarde comenzar a imaginar formas nuevas de convivir aún en lo político que nos suelen vender y solemos comprar como algo fundamental a usanza de Schmitt. Vale más, detenernos y comprender que sin un rumbo único se debe negociar y conciliar pues nadie tiene La Razón ni podrá tenerla jamás. Lo valioso de la expresión de Habermas radica en que pretende sin duda, dotar a nuestras expresiones de cierto sentido de responsabilidad inherente y por tanto, que la misma se extienda a sus consecuencias. Sin embargo, tal pretensión no sólo asume e implica necesariamente el uso de un lenguaje trascendental que es sólo vecino de habitación del mito sino que anula de un plumazo nuestra capacidad de generar realidades diversas y la posibilidad de construcción de consensos basados en razones y justificaciones entre nosotros con base en el ejercicio de un diálogo en el que exista una conciencia de respeto y responsabilidad sin que los mismos estén referidos a La Verdad o La Razón sino que su foco sea lo Humano, el Otro. Una conciencia cuya "razón" y "verdad" sean contingentes pero compartidas en conjuntos que se empalman, se intersectan y a veces nunca lo hacen. Una conciencia de que vivimos en un escenario en constante caos y contingencia en el que quizá sean las cosas como las planteó Oakeshott. Todos estamos en altamar, en una misma nave y sin la certeza respecto de la existencia de un puerto seguro; sin duda, el mejor camino sería hacer todos lo mejor posible para no naufragar.
octubre 27, 2010
DE TRANSPARENCIA Y CORRUPCIÓN
¿Es el combate a la corrupción una obligación exclusiva del Estado y de los tres órdenes de gobierno? Es evidente que resulta fácil y tentador responder afirmativamente a tal interrogante. Sin embargo, tomar tal atajo nos lleva a senderos que también parecen poco claros y en nada responden o nos dotan de elementos para ubicarnos en el problema real.
La corrupción, percibida desde la óptica estrictamente ciudadana parece ser toda desviación de la normalidad institucional o de la función pública atribuíble a un servidor público y que se actualiza por virtud de privilegiar consideraciones particulares sobre las institucionales o colectivas con el fin de obtener un beneficio indebido o evitar un perjuicio debido. Tal concepción empero, es a todas luces parcial pues lo corrupto no se enquista o aloja exclusivamente en lo burocrático. Lejos de ello, las relaciones de corrupción son intrincadas y generalmente superan las esferas institucionales pues en muchas ocasiones también, se trata de ralaciones bi o plurilaterales en la que diversos actores se coordinan y alinean en sus acciones para la obtención de fines ilícitos.
La corrupción, su estado actual y la defensa de la sociedad ante tal flagelo resultan entonces temas compartidos en esta y en toda sociedad. No se pueden entender en su papel a las autoridades fiscalizadoras sin la contraparte ciudadana de la denuncia. De igual modo, poco productivo resulta tratar de enmendar acciones corruptas en ciudadanos formados cuando tal labor debe para ser efectiva, empezar desde la más tierna edad, en casa.
Impregnar la vida de los infantes de principios sólidos de respeto a la alteridad, a la propiedad ajena y a la justicia (por vago que resulte este último concepto en casos límite), es imperativo para cada familia pues es el niño que hace trampas hoy en sus juegos y se le permite, involuciona en el ciudadano que defrauda, miente y con su negligencia y desprecio por los demás hace daño a la sociedad en su conjunto, es el corrupto del mañana.
Cierto es que nuestro país por mucho dista de ser ejemplo de transparencia y ausencia de corrupción a nivel global. Cierto es también sin duda que las baterías del gobierno mexicano en este sexenio como nunca, han encarado la lucha contra la ilegalidad en todos los frentes posibles e incluso que en la más cruenta de sus trincheras han muerto muchos compatriotas. Cierto resulta igualmente afirmar que la tarea no está acabada por el lado del gobierno... ¿Pero no es igualmente cierto que la situación en que vivimos no la generó el gobierno solamente? ¿No es igualmente cierto que en nuestras trincheras personales a veces desdeñamos el orden y la legalidad por privilegiar soluciones más relajadas que nos acercan peligrosamente a fronteras de por sí poco claras entre lo debido y lo indebido? ¿No es cierto que manejamos a veces un doble discurso y una doble moral entre nuestro fuero interno y el público?
La lucha contra la corrupción requiere de cada mexicano, de su compromiso y responsabilidad; de cada conciencia, de cada voluntad y de cada denuncia. Requiere de todos y cada uno de nosotros mirando de frente, decididamente y de una vez por todas, al país que queremos para nuestros hijos.
junio 21, 2010
Congruencias partisanas
No nos engañemos, la realidad política que vivimos es resultado de una serie de pactos como los que ocurren dentro y fuera de las instituciones polítcas formales de cualquier país. En los salones de sesiones pero también en lo guardado, en lo obscurito. Así es la política, comprende de algún modo todo el actuar humano.
Ahora es el PRI quien "acusa" indignado y desencajado la existencia de elecciones de Estado y acarreos y demás. Han cruzado el río y ahora perciben las cosas desde la orilla opuesta. No es más. Y es que una vez alcanzado el cargo, el partisanismo implica necesariamente tender la mano al compañero correligionario. Quizá ello parezca razonable aún al más idealista y romántico. El problema surge cuando dicha posición se confunde y se transforma en complicidad y encubrimiento. En ese momento se ha cruzado el umbral de la ilegalidad para entrar en un terreno del que no hay retorno porque los engranes del Estado no paran su curso. Se ha ingresado al terreno de la traición de una representación política de por sí desmejorada, pálida y con pocos medios para reanimarse en el marco del actual andamiaje institucional.
Cruzado dicho umbral ya no importa la adscripción, no hay distinción de colores o tendencias, se ha superado toda barrera de esa índole por preservar la congruencia del militante, del simpatizante; en realidad, para autopreservarse a costa de la propia institución que representan y de la que forman parte.
Las conductas cuya sanción hoy con dedos flamígeros reclaman algunos, son aquellas en las que una y otra vez incurren todos en mayor o menor medida. Unos se cuidan más, otros hasta para eso son negligentes. El cinismo insultante de negar lo evidente; se trate de videos o grabaciones, debe recordarnos que aunque no contamos con la figura de la reelección que tanto bien traería a este país amén de posturas infundadas; al menos tenemos una ocasión para sancionar de algún modo a quien no haya hecho su trabajo. Es de nosotros de quienes depende que la complicidad y el encubrimiento no se perpetúen con independencia de su origen y de filias y fobias personales. Seguir pensando que todo está bien me recuerda tanto a Brecht pues quizá nadie diga nada cuando vengan por nosotros.
Ahora es el PRI quien "acusa" indignado y desencajado la existencia de elecciones de Estado y acarreos y demás. Han cruzado el río y ahora perciben las cosas desde la orilla opuesta. No es más. Y es que una vez alcanzado el cargo, el partisanismo implica necesariamente tender la mano al compañero correligionario. Quizá ello parezca razonable aún al más idealista y romántico. El problema surge cuando dicha posición se confunde y se transforma en complicidad y encubrimiento. En ese momento se ha cruzado el umbral de la ilegalidad para entrar en un terreno del que no hay retorno porque los engranes del Estado no paran su curso. Se ha ingresado al terreno de la traición de una representación política de por sí desmejorada, pálida y con pocos medios para reanimarse en el marco del actual andamiaje institucional.
Cruzado dicho umbral ya no importa la adscripción, no hay distinción de colores o tendencias, se ha superado toda barrera de esa índole por preservar la congruencia del militante, del simpatizante; en realidad, para autopreservarse a costa de la propia institución que representan y de la que forman parte.
Las conductas cuya sanción hoy con dedos flamígeros reclaman algunos, son aquellas en las que una y otra vez incurren todos en mayor o menor medida. Unos se cuidan más, otros hasta para eso son negligentes. El cinismo insultante de negar lo evidente; se trate de videos o grabaciones, debe recordarnos que aunque no contamos con la figura de la reelección que tanto bien traería a este país amén de posturas infundadas; al menos tenemos una ocasión para sancionar de algún modo a quien no haya hecho su trabajo. Es de nosotros de quienes depende que la complicidad y el encubrimiento no se perpetúen con independencia de su origen y de filias y fobias personales. Seguir pensando que todo está bien me recuerda tanto a Brecht pues quizá nadie diga nada cuando vengan por nosotros.
mayo 31, 2010
El dinero no se puede comer
La tragedia del último derrame en el Golfo de México y la falta de control ex ante y ex post en este tipo de situaciones, pondrán en evidencia eventualmente una cosa: que el dinero no se puede comer.
Me parece en verdad insultante que se ordene la cancelación de toda perforación profunda en la zona y simultáneamente se acompañe tal instrucción con el aderezo de una corrupción conocida por ser ésta un secreto a voces y se levante el dedo flamígero contra ella. Demasiado tarde.
Eventualidades, imprevistos, siempre los ha habido y los habrá, la discusión me parece que no es esa. Considero que sin caer en el error de sostener a ultranza la utilización de bio-combustibles cuyos altos costos e impactos sociales han sido estudiados en otros lados, no puede en forma alguna desvincularse el tema de responsabilidad del de la exploración de combustibles fósiles.
Asumamos la realidad, no se vislumbra en breve término al menos, un giro en la forma que tenemos de transportanos y mover el mundo en el que vivimos. Las necesidades cada vez crecientes demandan que la oferta se responsabilice por la forma de generación de la misma en un mundo compartido y con ecosistemas endémicos de fragilidad comprobada. La sustentabilidad no es un término académico, es una exigencia a la que todos de un modo u otro nos hemos resistido pero sin la que no hay futuro viable.
No pretendo desdeñar en modo alguno la relevancia específica de diversos temas en la actualidad ni encarar las furiosas reacciones de quienes ansían vitorear hazañas deportivas en breve, sólo quizá plantear que el desinterés por ciertos temas me hacen preguntar a veces si no es más importante velar por la salud de los de casa. Los efectos de lo que hoy pasa, los viviremos y sufriremos por décadas por venir. Derrames anteriores lo demuestran así. Quizá es la inconsecuencia la que me hace preguntar hasta cuándo nos daremos cuenta como lo hizo el indígena americano, de que el dinero no se puede comer.
Me parece en verdad insultante que se ordene la cancelación de toda perforación profunda en la zona y simultáneamente se acompañe tal instrucción con el aderezo de una corrupción conocida por ser ésta un secreto a voces y se levante el dedo flamígero contra ella. Demasiado tarde.
Eventualidades, imprevistos, siempre los ha habido y los habrá, la discusión me parece que no es esa. Considero que sin caer en el error de sostener a ultranza la utilización de bio-combustibles cuyos altos costos e impactos sociales han sido estudiados en otros lados, no puede en forma alguna desvincularse el tema de responsabilidad del de la exploración de combustibles fósiles.
Asumamos la realidad, no se vislumbra en breve término al menos, un giro en la forma que tenemos de transportanos y mover el mundo en el que vivimos. Las necesidades cada vez crecientes demandan que la oferta se responsabilice por la forma de generación de la misma en un mundo compartido y con ecosistemas endémicos de fragilidad comprobada. La sustentabilidad no es un término académico, es una exigencia a la que todos de un modo u otro nos hemos resistido pero sin la que no hay futuro viable.
No pretendo desdeñar en modo alguno la relevancia específica de diversos temas en la actualidad ni encarar las furiosas reacciones de quienes ansían vitorear hazañas deportivas en breve, sólo quizá plantear que el desinterés por ciertos temas me hacen preguntar a veces si no es más importante velar por la salud de los de casa. Los efectos de lo que hoy pasa, los viviremos y sufriremos por décadas por venir. Derrames anteriores lo demuestran así. Quizá es la inconsecuencia la que me hace preguntar hasta cuándo nos daremos cuenta como lo hizo el indígena americano, de que el dinero no se puede comer.
mayo 24, 2010
Solidarity versus Objectivity
The distinctive feature of post philosophical pragmatism is probably the substitution of objectivity for a more democratic term: solidarity.
From this particular point of view, philosophy can no longer claim to be the mother of all sciences, one which holds and deploys the one and only valid vocabulary. Our understanding of what constitutes valid knowledge from an epistemological point of view broadens its horizons to different and various forms of what has been called "cultural criticism" which transforms philosophy into simply another discipline among the rest of them. One which is historically and context biased as any other branch of human behaviour.
Pluralism and secularization therefore represent the keys which will close the chapter of metaphysics, epistemology and foundationalism.
In this vast and uncertain field, the multiplicity of realities and approaches to the social realm, every theory seems to be affected by relativity and it sure is. That might be the way to go if we are to question our realities in pursuit of a better future.
From this particular point of view, philosophy can no longer claim to be the mother of all sciences, one which holds and deploys the one and only valid vocabulary. Our understanding of what constitutes valid knowledge from an epistemological point of view broadens its horizons to different and various forms of what has been called "cultural criticism" which transforms philosophy into simply another discipline among the rest of them. One which is historically and context biased as any other branch of human behaviour.
Pluralism and secularization therefore represent the keys which will close the chapter of metaphysics, epistemology and foundationalism.
In this vast and uncertain field, the multiplicity of realities and approaches to the social realm, every theory seems to be affected by relativity and it sure is. That might be the way to go if we are to question our realities in pursuit of a better future.
mayo 17, 2010
Te encontré.
En cada amanecer que te evoca en su calma.
En cada beso, abrazo, que la luna daba a mi alma.
En la sonrisa eterna de cada niño, de cada anciano, de cada amigo.
Lo hice entre la humedad de unas sábanas que te desean casi tanto como yo.
Ahí, recostada, haciéndoles sentir que son eternas, como por tí lo soy yo.
En la esperanza que da cada día.
En el suspiro de quien espera …
En la mano que se tiende.
En el llanto que se llueve.
En la vida que sin ti me agota.
En cada uno de mis días.
En cada uno de mis pasos.
En cada uno de los momentos en que te pensé sin saber que si existías.
Te vi cernida sobre mi como la luz por las persianas.
Como el aire que da vida.
Como el universo que no acaba.
The man behind the mirror.
En cada beso, abrazo, que la luna daba a mi alma.
En la sonrisa eterna de cada niño, de cada anciano, de cada amigo.
Lo hice entre la humedad de unas sábanas que te desean casi tanto como yo.
Ahí, recostada, haciéndoles sentir que son eternas, como por tí lo soy yo.
En la esperanza que da cada día.
En el suspiro de quien espera …
En la mano que se tiende.
En el llanto que se llueve.
En la vida que sin ti me agota.
En cada uno de mis días.
En cada uno de mis pasos.
En cada uno de los momentos en que te pensé sin saber que si existías.
Te vi cernida sobre mi como la luz por las persianas.
Como el aire que da vida.
Como el universo que no acaba.
The man behind the mirror.
mayo 14, 2010
ESPERANZAS VIGENTES Y EL FIN DEL PLATONISMO
El pragmatismo como postura filosófica, en una de sus vertientes más serias representada por Rorty nos presenta una forma diversa de aproximarnos al fenómeno que denominamos verdad o realidad.
La verdad o realidad son así objetos carentes de una teoría filosóficamente interesante tras de sí. Para el pragmatismo, la verdad es simplemente una propiedad o característica que comparten todos los enunciados ciertos y no más; razón que implica necesariamente que hay poco, si es que hay algo que decir, respecto de tal propiedad o característica. Ejemplificando, desde la óptica pragmatista, el afirmar de un modo moral normativo un determinado enunciado como "bueno" y reconocer tal característica en similares enunciados, no implica la posibilidad de generalizar y obtener algo útil de la generalización de tal característica que afirmamos puesto que el hecho de afirmar determinado enunciado o la adquisición consciente de una creencia, es tan sólo una justificable y valiosa acción en ciertas circunstancias específicas.
En este escenario, la postura pragmatista plantea el desgaste del platonismo como modo de explicar las cosas al haber perdido su utilidad. Lo anterior, en nada implica que los pragmatistas cuenten con un nuevo conjunto de respuestas a las preguntas platónicas tradicionales sino que incluso van más allá; plantea la necesidad de abandonar tales cuestionamientos. Tampoco, el pragmatismo postula teoría alguna sobre la naturaleza de la realidad, el conocimiento o el hombre en la que no existan la verdad y el bien, razón por la que se le ha tachado a esta corriente de relativista y subjetivista. Se trata simple pero complejamente de un cambio de objeto de discusión. En "Consequences of Pragmatism" (Rorty, 1982) el autor compara tal postura y la expone como análoga a la que ocuparon los secularistas al urgir a las autoridades eclesiásticas a dejar la "investigación" respecto a la naturaleza y voluntad divinas. En el fondo, el cambio de paradigma consiste en un cambio de lenguaje. En el uso de un conjunto de herramientas diferentes para aproximarnos al terreno de lo social como algo que todos compartimos. Algo por tanto, respecto de lo que no es válido imponer posturas basadas en un presunto conocimiento no compartido pero adquirido por virtud de poseer capacidades especiales que permiten a unos cuantos elegidos ver, a diferencia de los comunes, escencias y rumbos a seguir.
El cambio radica en la generación de un lenguaje común que sea "verdadero" en la medida que funcione en nuestro contexto específico y sea compartido como resultado del debate de las ideas en condiciones de igualdad. Así, la actividad filosófica compleja por lo ambiguo de su objeto, se acerca un tanto a la poesía en tanto plantea mejores escenarios posibles que sólo podrán ver la luz en la medida que la solidaridad nos haga mirar hacia nosotros mismos, voltear a nuestros semejantes y no a la caverna inexpugnable en busca de escencias y verdades inmutables que contemplar.
Marcos J. Perea Arellano
La verdad o realidad son así objetos carentes de una teoría filosóficamente interesante tras de sí. Para el pragmatismo, la verdad es simplemente una propiedad o característica que comparten todos los enunciados ciertos y no más; razón que implica necesariamente que hay poco, si es que hay algo que decir, respecto de tal propiedad o característica. Ejemplificando, desde la óptica pragmatista, el afirmar de un modo moral normativo un determinado enunciado como "bueno" y reconocer tal característica en similares enunciados, no implica la posibilidad de generalizar y obtener algo útil de la generalización de tal característica que afirmamos puesto que el hecho de afirmar determinado enunciado o la adquisición consciente de una creencia, es tan sólo una justificable y valiosa acción en ciertas circunstancias específicas.
En este escenario, la postura pragmatista plantea el desgaste del platonismo como modo de explicar las cosas al haber perdido su utilidad. Lo anterior, en nada implica que los pragmatistas cuenten con un nuevo conjunto de respuestas a las preguntas platónicas tradicionales sino que incluso van más allá; plantea la necesidad de abandonar tales cuestionamientos. Tampoco, el pragmatismo postula teoría alguna sobre la naturaleza de la realidad, el conocimiento o el hombre en la que no existan la verdad y el bien, razón por la que se le ha tachado a esta corriente de relativista y subjetivista. Se trata simple pero complejamente de un cambio de objeto de discusión. En "Consequences of Pragmatism" (Rorty, 1982) el autor compara tal postura y la expone como análoga a la que ocuparon los secularistas al urgir a las autoridades eclesiásticas a dejar la "investigación" respecto a la naturaleza y voluntad divinas. En el fondo, el cambio de paradigma consiste en un cambio de lenguaje. En el uso de un conjunto de herramientas diferentes para aproximarnos al terreno de lo social como algo que todos compartimos. Algo por tanto, respecto de lo que no es válido imponer posturas basadas en un presunto conocimiento no compartido pero adquirido por virtud de poseer capacidades especiales que permiten a unos cuantos elegidos ver, a diferencia de los comunes, escencias y rumbos a seguir.
El cambio radica en la generación de un lenguaje común que sea "verdadero" en la medida que funcione en nuestro contexto específico y sea compartido como resultado del debate de las ideas en condiciones de igualdad. Así, la actividad filosófica compleja por lo ambiguo de su objeto, se acerca un tanto a la poesía en tanto plantea mejores escenarios posibles que sólo podrán ver la luz en la medida que la solidaridad nos haga mirar hacia nosotros mismos, voltear a nuestros semejantes y no a la caverna inexpugnable en busca de escencias y verdades inmutables que contemplar.
Marcos J. Perea Arellano
mayo 13, 2010
IS A SCIENCE OF POLITICS POSSIBLE?
In asking this kind of question we are really and implicitly asking whether a science of society can exist, that is the main question. A science in its full sense like the ones we have developed for the study of nature and its phenomena. Is that possible? Political science and more generally put, social sciences are studied and taught in every of such departments at hundreds of universities all over the world. Is it science what we use when we engage in the study of social behaviour? If the answer is yes, everything appears to make sense but what if not? Sense? According to which standards? What are we doing if we are not engaged in science when we study social and/or political phenomena? Is it mere descriptions that we can make which are therefore mere opinions and no true knowledge? Is that all we can hope for?
The answer to the main question, from which it is obvious that the rest derive, can be better understood if we distinguish, as Winch[1] rightly does it, between the way in which we understand natural and social phenomena. In the former, our understanding is given in terms of cause and effect, causality; whereas in the latter, our understanding of social phenomena involves such terms as motives and reasons for actions, motives and reasons which are of such complexity that they cannot be reduced to a link within a chain of causally connected events. It was probably the influence of the tradition in western culture and its search for truth that got us into its inertia and made us look for the alleged objectivity that political science and its scholars claim for their studies and activity. An objectivity which it is said, can only be achieved through the strict and dispassionate use of a rigorous method and which takes form in law-like generalizations, the objectivity and certainty of science. Can we study society in such a way?
As we have said before, the distinction lies in the different terms with which we understand and therefore explain the natural and the social. Generalizations in causality are of an empirical nature whereas when we talk about generality in relation to reasons for action we have to appeal to rules instead. Eventhough we normally use terms of causal explanation and apply it to human behaviour what we are doing is to indicate what is being explained as to its origins but we are saying little if anything about how it is explained or how the explanation in itself looks like.[2]
Winch argues that the nature of philosophy and the nature of social studies amount in the end to the same thing: any study of society must be philosophical in character and any worthwhile philosophy must be concerned with the nature of human society.[3] Social sciences must therefore be philosophical, because philosophy does not only solve linguistic problems and is not only limited to the underlabourer conception criticized by Winch.[4] For while scientists investigate the nature, causes and effects of certain particular and real things, the philosopher is busy asking for the nature of reality as such and in general, he asks for what is real and this is a question which presupposes the problem of man’s relation to reality, a problem which puts us in a realm beyond pure science in which empirical methods cannot help for the question is a conceptual and not an empirical one. Philosophy does therefore not prove or disaprove the existence of the world but elucidates the concept of externality in itself. It is therefore needed in the studies of society, that we engage in a philosophical discussion of language because doing so is indeed to discuss what counts as belonging to the world. This is definitely a kind of inquiry which is radically different than the ones with which science is concerned and can solve. Therefore, the question of what constitutes social or political behaviour is a demand for an elucidation of those concepts, a philosophical elucidation for philosophy is to give an account of the nature of social phenomena.
If the subject matter of empirical and conceptual enquiries is different there must be a difference related to our claim for understanding something depending on what realm it belongs to. And the problem is that intelligibility of the social and/or political varies according to its context, which only adds to our intuition that there are only different ways of perceiving things, different realities in other words and not a single and perennial metareality to be discovered or elucidated. This leaves no space for law-like generalizations of the kind used by natural sciences. Winch says that social behaviour becomes meaningful behaviour when it is rule governed, that is to say that we study people with conceptual schemes and human practices which are both context dependant and in which the behaviour acquires its meaning or its symbolic character for it is group-life what the existence of concepts depends on.[5] It is only within a conceptual scheme where actions can be given a subjective sense (Sinn). Principles, precepts, definitions and alike derive their sense from the context of social activity in which they are applied and are therefore incompatible with the kind of explanation that natural sciences offer.
Hence, we are to explain human behaviour without appealing to causal law-like generalizations about the individual’s reaction to his enviroment but to our knowledge of the context which gives meaning to his actions and this necessarily presupposes our studying of social institutions and ways of life.
One characteristic difference between an empirical and a social enquiry is then the fact that in the empirical one, one deals with only one set of rules, the ones which we develop and use in the study of the phenomenon we wish to give an account for and which simultaneosly are to allow us a dispassionate study of the facts from a detached and neutral point of view.[6] On the other hand, a social enquiry cannot be seen as putting us in the same kind of relationship between the observer and the observed (agent or phenomenon) for in knowing or having to study the context in which the behaviour acquires meaning we have to include the language of the agents in the language of our social explanation, by doing so we are taking the descriptions of the actors themselves seriously.[7]
But even doing so, the predictive claims that modern social and political sciences make and which supposedly give them the status of “science” are unsustainable for the reason that if an observer of the social and/or political wants to predict the behaviour of a certain agent, his familiarizing himself with the concepts in terms of which the agent views the situation will not be sufficient to predict any certain and unique behaviour since the notions the observer uses to predict are nonetheless compatible with the agent’s taking a different decision from that predicted for him by the observer and that is so because the outcomes in social sciences are not determined by their antecedent conditions in the given context. Moreover, it surely does not follow from this that the observer nor the agent made a mistake. Put differently, intelligibility has many various forms and not only one.[8]
The problem has been, as Macintyre addresses it regarding the possibility of having a science of comparative politics, that ‘the study of political culture, of political attitudes, as it has been developed, seems to rest upon the assumption that it is possible to identify political attitudes independently of political institutions and practices’[9] and this is a false assumption for in first place, we can only identify and define attitudes in terms of the objects towards they are directed and not vice versa. Additionally, institutions and practices depend on what certain people think and feel about them[10] in a certain context which results in the fact that we cannot take them as objects for our studies or comparisons as if they were neutral in relation to the agents which perform them. In other words, they are not simply facts which the social scholar can take as given regardless of any further considerations. This fact is once more one which does not allow us to make the law-like generalizations that science requires for its type of explanation. Moreover, Macintyre argues that the law-like generalizations that are sometimes claimed to have been made by political scientists either lack the kind of confirmation that they require or are the mere consequences of true generalizations about human rationality and not part of a specifically political science as such.[11]
If we take all these elements into account: social science being a philosophical enterprise, the distinction between the terms in which our understanding is expressed depending of the suject matter of our studies (causality vs. reasons for action), the different relationship between abserver and observed in natural and social sciences, the context-dependency of our subject matter in social studies, the language of the agent’s self-understanding that we ought to include in our social explanations and the consequent impossibility of coming up with law-like generalizations when studying social and/or political behaviour, we necessarily come down to the question about the kind of understanding which is required for an adequate explanatory account in the so called sciences of man. This only means that the differences between natural sciences and social ones do not end there. There are many approaches proposed by many authors. It is Taylor once again who studies for example the implications of taking account of the agents’ own description of his behaviour. First of all, we would require, he argues, to correctly apply the desirability characterizations of the agent himself in order to claim our understanding of his behaviour but this certainly represents the emergence of two additional problems in our attempt to get to the scientific certainty we would want our own understanding to reach. Firstly, desirability characterizations cannot be intersubjectively validated in an unproblematic way since they give way to potentially endless interpretive dispute and secondly, that these desirability characterizations are expressed in inextricable evaluative terms, that is as specifying certain things as normative for desire. It is for the given reasons that eventhough according to Taylor and Winch, in an ideal situation it is by the correct application of the desirability characterizations that we understand people, those characterizations are of little if of any help for being the basis of a science of society.[12]
The question about the kind of understanding which is required for an adequate explanatory account in the social studies and about the accurate method to achieve it has been tried to be solved by several authors in various ways. Appeals to functionalist theories (of integration for example) have been made in order to go one step further from the application of desirability characterizations and in order to escape from the difficulties that their application represent. One more problem arises then since this actually represents an attempt to finesse our understanding by using a general thesis about the subject that we are going to study which does not only imply that we are going to disregard certain aspects of the agents’ self understanding but that we are going to modify it. Even worse, even if we could validate the functionalist theory wich we had used we would still have to ask for the significance of our finding because little would we be able to explain of the actual shape of certain institutions and that is so because most of what we actually want to explain in a given society may in fact be found to be outside the scope of explanation. Thus it is futile to attempt to identify what the agents are doing with scientific language.[13]
Let us now consider the language of self understanding that we are supposed to take into account as a fundamental part of our social explanation. Strong evaluations are involved in this language, strong evaluations in form of commitments which we cannot simply extract and which actually put us in an additional problem, namely the one which arises when we as observers do not share those commitments. This is a rather obvious point to be seen since when we explain the actions of people whose ontology we do not share we find that that language is full of wrong, distorted, incoherent, misleading or inadequate value/ontological commitments.[14] The actual account of what the agents are doing or did would then be given in terms of our own ontology, an ontology which would not only discard the agents’ own positions but would also treat them as highly corregible since we would ultimately regard them as wrong from our own perspective. This would evidently be anything but a value-free science, a point to which I shall return later.
In the search for objectivity and a wertfreie science of the social neutralism came about with its idea that regarding strong evaluations we cannot speak of truth of the matter. Neutralism appeals to a dispassionate use of the language without being commited to ‘the pro-attitudes which accompany this language in the agent’s discourse’[15] Science in this case is supposed to remain neutral since it treats the strong evaluations or commitments as based on a confusion and as mere pro attitudes reflected in the evaluative language. But this approach is clearly incompatible with understanding because it tries to apply a ‘canonically transposed language in which all the criteria of application of terms are neutral’[16], the language is not the same as the original since its descriptive terms have been cleaned up.
The evaluations included in a given language are to be seen and considered in the context of a form of life, a form of life which is obviously not to be affirmed or denied since it is a fact, it is how people in fact live. In other words, we cannot abstract ontological commitments from any utterances, on the contrary, we can only understand them in the context of the whole form of life which therefore becomes our unit of judgment and forms of life cannot be true nor false, they are simply what they are, what we or they do.
Winch,Taylor, Skinner, Collingwood and other authors have proposed different solutions to the way in which we gain understanding in the sciences of man. No consensus can be reached as for which is the accurate methodology to use. And the problem seems to be a never ending one since no science of politics or of society seems to be able to emerge from the fact that choosing a certain methodology automatically implies adhering to a philosophical theory on which validity (not testable in an unproblematic way) our work will depend.[17] Social sciences are inextricably philosophical and value laden. The explanatory framework we choose in order to approach our selected subject matter impacts on the kind of explanation that we end up with. Theoretical frameworks tell us what needs to be explained and by what kind of factors, they set the crucial dimensions through which the phenomena at study can vary. Moreover, the theoretical framework we adopt represents a value position in which a certain hierarchy or array of things prevails as we see it and which will lead the course of our studies.[18] Every study of society or of politics can therefore not be seen as value free or value neutral. In fact, as Macintyre rightly puts it, the ‘insistence on [political studies] being value free involves the most extreme of value commitments.’[19] Hence, there is a direct correlation between the framework we adopt and the value judgments that it implies, the built in value slope that it represents. Any certain framework is commited to a normative view and to a conception of the human needs, purposes, goals, and alike. Assuming a certain approach requires to assume its consequences on the outcomes and we cannot forget that a reason (to adopt a certain framework for example) is always a reason-for-somebody, a somebody who finds it a reason for him since he has accepted the implied values in it. Moreover, explanatory frameworks applied to society or politics secrete a notion of good and not only a value slope and this values and notions cannot be overridden without removing the explanatory framework as well. Once again we see that there is no single method which like in physics can lead the sociologists or political scholars to the neutral, dispassionate and value free study of their subject matter. We cannot predict and we cannot easily prove anything in these realms. And even if we could, our predictions would be so limited in their scope and extension that we could never pretend them to reach the level of generality and objectivity that science requires from its findings and for its purposes, we cannot claim to have the kind of knowledge that science is supposed to yield.
There is therefore no way for us to approach the social and/or political phenomena from a pure scientific and therefore value free and detached perspective. There is no way to ‘step outside our community long enough to examine it in the light of something which trascends it, namely, that which it has in common with every other actual and possible human community.’[20] There is no reality without understanding and without language but these two are context dependant once again. There are in other words no essences waiting to be discovered or rediscovered and to think so is to seek comfort in the illusory idea that human history has a path to follow in which it developes itself into something superior overcoming the distinction between the natural and the social, that would be in terms of Rorty, to exhibit a kind of solidarity which would then not be parochial because it would be the expression of an ahistorical human nature.[21] Such a nature does not exist. The rules of rationality are then not being given from the outside but are defined by the local cultural norms of the social phenomenon we study and these are the ones we have to apply. There is a feedback so to say between the observer and the observed unlike in the natural sciences where the phenomena are presented to the scientist in an immediate relation for him to study.
The study of the social and/or the political is a philosophical activity in the form of a discussion of terms, concepts, ideas and principles. When we study them we have to approach them from a historic point of view, taking into account what the agents meant or intended to mean and the way in which they understood what they were doing. Whether one does so by the use of a rational, historical, geistesgeschichtliche or intellectual reconstruction will obviously make a difference in the nature of our results[22] since as we have seen, the choice of a certain theoretical framework impacts on the methodology we deploy to study the phenomenon we want to analyze as well as on the spectrum of relevant elements that we will consider in our study and most importantly, it makes us assume a position from inside a certain value slope, neutrality vanishes and we take positions and eliminate possibilities. We can always commit anachronisms, parochialisms, historical absurdities, we can correct authors and utterances or may be not but we are like Skinner says, definitely and unavoidably set in approaching any given writer or author by the characteristics of the discipline to which he is said to have contributed.[23]
When we discuss politics we engage in politics, we are defining what counts as political and what does not but the language we use, contrary to what one would believe is of the same kind as the one which is used by the agents we intend to analyze, we engage in a debate with them and shape value principles, assumptions, terms, concepts and ideas. Specifically in politics more than in any other branch of the social those concepts are contested ones for disagreement is an element inherent to the political. There are no perennial questions, there are just the questions that we in our tradition have to face and answer, there is no uniformity to be found, everyone has a position which is not only context biased but his activity is of a kind that it engages in the disagreement, it cannot be neutral, it cannot be detached. Political agents use concepts which are inherently contested or with a built in contestability. Concepts which like Gallie says[24], are appraisive, variously describable, open in character and which are used both defensively and aggressively. Moreover, these concepts seem to be derived from some kind of an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the users of the concept and the continuous competition between them for acknowledgement enables the said exemplar to be sustained or developed to its possible best. These concepts themselves and their sui generis use reflect the disagreement. The reality is shaped by language so there is nothing outside from us. A science of politics is therefore a chimeric thought. There are no law like generalizations to be made in society and therefore not in politics either, there is no unique method, no perennial questions to be solved, when we analyze the political we engage in the same activity as the agents we analyze, we take sides. The philosophy which we would require to apply in order to study the political would be political itself and there is no way out of that.
Bibliography
Gallie, W.B., (1956), Essentially Contested Concepts, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Harrison & Sons., London
Macintyre, Alasdair, (1971) in The Philosophy of Social Explanation, A. Ryan (ed.), (1973) Oxford University Press, London
Minogue Kenneth, Method in Intellectual History in Tully, J. (ed.) Meaning and Context, (distributed photocopies)
Rorty, Richard, (1984), The Historiography of Philosophy. Four Genres in Rorty, J.B. Schneewind and Skinner, Q. (eds.), Philosophy in history: essays on the historiography of philosophy Cambridge University Press
----------, (2002) Solidarity or Objectivity? in Cahoone, L. (ed.) From Modernism to Postmodernism, Oxford, Blackwell
Skinner, Q., Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas in Tully, J. (ed.) Meaning and Context, (distributed photocopies)
Taylor, Charles (1967) Neutrality in Political Science in The Philosophy of Social Explanation, A. Ryan (ed.), (1973) Oxford University Press, London, p. 140
----------, (1981) Understanding and Explanation in the Geisteswissenschaften in Wittgenstein: To follow a rule, S.H. Holtzmann and C.M. Leich (ed.) Routledge, London
Winch, Peter (1958), The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, second edition, Routledge, London
[1] See Winch, Peter (1958), The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, second edition, Routledge, London, p. xi
[2] Cfr. Íbid., p. xiii
[3] See, Íbid., p. 3
[4] See, Íbid., p. 3-6
[5] See, Íbid., pp. 42-44
[6] See Taylor, Charles (1967) Neutrality in Political Science in The Philosophy of Social Explanation, A. Ryan (ed.), (1973) Oxford University Press, London, p. 140
[7] See, Taylor, Charles (1981) Understanding and Explanation in the Geisteswissenschaften in Wittgenstein: To follow a rule, S.H. Holtzmann and C.M. Leich (ed.) Routledge, London, p. 191
[8] Winch, Peter, Op. Cit., pp.91-93
[9] See, Macintyre, Alasdair, (1971) in The Philosophy of Social Explanation, A. Ryan (ed.), (1973) Oxford University Press, London, p. 172
[10] See Íbid., p. 174
[11] See Íbid., p. 178
[12] See Taylor, Charles (1981) Op Cit., pp. 192-193
[13] See, Ídem., pp. 194-197
[14] See, Ídem., pp. 198-199
[15] Ídem., p. 201
[16] Ídem., p. 202
[17] See Minogue Kenneth, Method in Intellectual History in Tully, J. (ed.) Meaning and Context, p.187 (distributed photocopies)
[18] See, Taylor, Charles (1967) Op. Cit., p. 150
[19] See Macintyre, Alasdair, Op.Cit., p. 188
[20] Rorty, Richard, (2002) Solidarity or Objectivity? in Cahoone, L. (ed.) From Modernism to Postmodernism, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 448
[21] Ídem.Rorty uses solidarity in opposition to objectivity implying that in the former we look forward to give sense to our lives by placing them in a larger context, that of a community which is obviously context biased.
[22] See Rorty, Richard, (1984), The Historiography of Philosophy. Four Genres in Rorty, J.B. Schneewind and Skinner, Q. (eds.), Philosophy in history: essays on the historiography of philosophy Cambridge University Press, pp-49-68
[23] Skinner, Q., Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas in Tully, J. (ed.) Meaning and Context, p. 43 (distributed photocopies)
[24] Gallie, W.B., (1956), Essentially Contested Concepts,in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Harrison & Sons., London, p. 171-180.
The answer to the main question, from which it is obvious that the rest derive, can be better understood if we distinguish, as Winch[1] rightly does it, between the way in which we understand natural and social phenomena. In the former, our understanding is given in terms of cause and effect, causality; whereas in the latter, our understanding of social phenomena involves such terms as motives and reasons for actions, motives and reasons which are of such complexity that they cannot be reduced to a link within a chain of causally connected events. It was probably the influence of the tradition in western culture and its search for truth that got us into its inertia and made us look for the alleged objectivity that political science and its scholars claim for their studies and activity. An objectivity which it is said, can only be achieved through the strict and dispassionate use of a rigorous method and which takes form in law-like generalizations, the objectivity and certainty of science. Can we study society in such a way?
As we have said before, the distinction lies in the different terms with which we understand and therefore explain the natural and the social. Generalizations in causality are of an empirical nature whereas when we talk about generality in relation to reasons for action we have to appeal to rules instead. Eventhough we normally use terms of causal explanation and apply it to human behaviour what we are doing is to indicate what is being explained as to its origins but we are saying little if anything about how it is explained or how the explanation in itself looks like.[2]
Winch argues that the nature of philosophy and the nature of social studies amount in the end to the same thing: any study of society must be philosophical in character and any worthwhile philosophy must be concerned with the nature of human society.[3] Social sciences must therefore be philosophical, because philosophy does not only solve linguistic problems and is not only limited to the underlabourer conception criticized by Winch.[4] For while scientists investigate the nature, causes and effects of certain particular and real things, the philosopher is busy asking for the nature of reality as such and in general, he asks for what is real and this is a question which presupposes the problem of man’s relation to reality, a problem which puts us in a realm beyond pure science in which empirical methods cannot help for the question is a conceptual and not an empirical one. Philosophy does therefore not prove or disaprove the existence of the world but elucidates the concept of externality in itself. It is therefore needed in the studies of society, that we engage in a philosophical discussion of language because doing so is indeed to discuss what counts as belonging to the world. This is definitely a kind of inquiry which is radically different than the ones with which science is concerned and can solve. Therefore, the question of what constitutes social or political behaviour is a demand for an elucidation of those concepts, a philosophical elucidation for philosophy is to give an account of the nature of social phenomena.
If the subject matter of empirical and conceptual enquiries is different there must be a difference related to our claim for understanding something depending on what realm it belongs to. And the problem is that intelligibility of the social and/or political varies according to its context, which only adds to our intuition that there are only different ways of perceiving things, different realities in other words and not a single and perennial metareality to be discovered or elucidated. This leaves no space for law-like generalizations of the kind used by natural sciences. Winch says that social behaviour becomes meaningful behaviour when it is rule governed, that is to say that we study people with conceptual schemes and human practices which are both context dependant and in which the behaviour acquires its meaning or its symbolic character for it is group-life what the existence of concepts depends on.[5] It is only within a conceptual scheme where actions can be given a subjective sense (Sinn). Principles, precepts, definitions and alike derive their sense from the context of social activity in which they are applied and are therefore incompatible with the kind of explanation that natural sciences offer.
Hence, we are to explain human behaviour without appealing to causal law-like generalizations about the individual’s reaction to his enviroment but to our knowledge of the context which gives meaning to his actions and this necessarily presupposes our studying of social institutions and ways of life.
One characteristic difference between an empirical and a social enquiry is then the fact that in the empirical one, one deals with only one set of rules, the ones which we develop and use in the study of the phenomenon we wish to give an account for and which simultaneosly are to allow us a dispassionate study of the facts from a detached and neutral point of view.[6] On the other hand, a social enquiry cannot be seen as putting us in the same kind of relationship between the observer and the observed (agent or phenomenon) for in knowing or having to study the context in which the behaviour acquires meaning we have to include the language of the agents in the language of our social explanation, by doing so we are taking the descriptions of the actors themselves seriously.[7]
But even doing so, the predictive claims that modern social and political sciences make and which supposedly give them the status of “science” are unsustainable for the reason that if an observer of the social and/or political wants to predict the behaviour of a certain agent, his familiarizing himself with the concepts in terms of which the agent views the situation will not be sufficient to predict any certain and unique behaviour since the notions the observer uses to predict are nonetheless compatible with the agent’s taking a different decision from that predicted for him by the observer and that is so because the outcomes in social sciences are not determined by their antecedent conditions in the given context. Moreover, it surely does not follow from this that the observer nor the agent made a mistake. Put differently, intelligibility has many various forms and not only one.[8]
The problem has been, as Macintyre addresses it regarding the possibility of having a science of comparative politics, that ‘the study of political culture, of political attitudes, as it has been developed, seems to rest upon the assumption that it is possible to identify political attitudes independently of political institutions and practices’[9] and this is a false assumption for in first place, we can only identify and define attitudes in terms of the objects towards they are directed and not vice versa. Additionally, institutions and practices depend on what certain people think and feel about them[10] in a certain context which results in the fact that we cannot take them as objects for our studies or comparisons as if they were neutral in relation to the agents which perform them. In other words, they are not simply facts which the social scholar can take as given regardless of any further considerations. This fact is once more one which does not allow us to make the law-like generalizations that science requires for its type of explanation. Moreover, Macintyre argues that the law-like generalizations that are sometimes claimed to have been made by political scientists either lack the kind of confirmation that they require or are the mere consequences of true generalizations about human rationality and not part of a specifically political science as such.[11]
If we take all these elements into account: social science being a philosophical enterprise, the distinction between the terms in which our understanding is expressed depending of the suject matter of our studies (causality vs. reasons for action), the different relationship between abserver and observed in natural and social sciences, the context-dependency of our subject matter in social studies, the language of the agent’s self-understanding that we ought to include in our social explanations and the consequent impossibility of coming up with law-like generalizations when studying social and/or political behaviour, we necessarily come down to the question about the kind of understanding which is required for an adequate explanatory account in the so called sciences of man. This only means that the differences between natural sciences and social ones do not end there. There are many approaches proposed by many authors. It is Taylor once again who studies for example the implications of taking account of the agents’ own description of his behaviour. First of all, we would require, he argues, to correctly apply the desirability characterizations of the agent himself in order to claim our understanding of his behaviour but this certainly represents the emergence of two additional problems in our attempt to get to the scientific certainty we would want our own understanding to reach. Firstly, desirability characterizations cannot be intersubjectively validated in an unproblematic way since they give way to potentially endless interpretive dispute and secondly, that these desirability characterizations are expressed in inextricable evaluative terms, that is as specifying certain things as normative for desire. It is for the given reasons that eventhough according to Taylor and Winch, in an ideal situation it is by the correct application of the desirability characterizations that we understand people, those characterizations are of little if of any help for being the basis of a science of society.[12]
The question about the kind of understanding which is required for an adequate explanatory account in the social studies and about the accurate method to achieve it has been tried to be solved by several authors in various ways. Appeals to functionalist theories (of integration for example) have been made in order to go one step further from the application of desirability characterizations and in order to escape from the difficulties that their application represent. One more problem arises then since this actually represents an attempt to finesse our understanding by using a general thesis about the subject that we are going to study which does not only imply that we are going to disregard certain aspects of the agents’ self understanding but that we are going to modify it. Even worse, even if we could validate the functionalist theory wich we had used we would still have to ask for the significance of our finding because little would we be able to explain of the actual shape of certain institutions and that is so because most of what we actually want to explain in a given society may in fact be found to be outside the scope of explanation. Thus it is futile to attempt to identify what the agents are doing with scientific language.[13]
Let us now consider the language of self understanding that we are supposed to take into account as a fundamental part of our social explanation. Strong evaluations are involved in this language, strong evaluations in form of commitments which we cannot simply extract and which actually put us in an additional problem, namely the one which arises when we as observers do not share those commitments. This is a rather obvious point to be seen since when we explain the actions of people whose ontology we do not share we find that that language is full of wrong, distorted, incoherent, misleading or inadequate value/ontological commitments.[14] The actual account of what the agents are doing or did would then be given in terms of our own ontology, an ontology which would not only discard the agents’ own positions but would also treat them as highly corregible since we would ultimately regard them as wrong from our own perspective. This would evidently be anything but a value-free science, a point to which I shall return later.
In the search for objectivity and a wertfreie science of the social neutralism came about with its idea that regarding strong evaluations we cannot speak of truth of the matter. Neutralism appeals to a dispassionate use of the language without being commited to ‘the pro-attitudes which accompany this language in the agent’s discourse’[15] Science in this case is supposed to remain neutral since it treats the strong evaluations or commitments as based on a confusion and as mere pro attitudes reflected in the evaluative language. But this approach is clearly incompatible with understanding because it tries to apply a ‘canonically transposed language in which all the criteria of application of terms are neutral’[16], the language is not the same as the original since its descriptive terms have been cleaned up.
The evaluations included in a given language are to be seen and considered in the context of a form of life, a form of life which is obviously not to be affirmed or denied since it is a fact, it is how people in fact live. In other words, we cannot abstract ontological commitments from any utterances, on the contrary, we can only understand them in the context of the whole form of life which therefore becomes our unit of judgment and forms of life cannot be true nor false, they are simply what they are, what we or they do.
Winch,Taylor, Skinner, Collingwood and other authors have proposed different solutions to the way in which we gain understanding in the sciences of man. No consensus can be reached as for which is the accurate methodology to use. And the problem seems to be a never ending one since no science of politics or of society seems to be able to emerge from the fact that choosing a certain methodology automatically implies adhering to a philosophical theory on which validity (not testable in an unproblematic way) our work will depend.[17] Social sciences are inextricably philosophical and value laden. The explanatory framework we choose in order to approach our selected subject matter impacts on the kind of explanation that we end up with. Theoretical frameworks tell us what needs to be explained and by what kind of factors, they set the crucial dimensions through which the phenomena at study can vary. Moreover, the theoretical framework we adopt represents a value position in which a certain hierarchy or array of things prevails as we see it and which will lead the course of our studies.[18] Every study of society or of politics can therefore not be seen as value free or value neutral. In fact, as Macintyre rightly puts it, the ‘insistence on [political studies] being value free involves the most extreme of value commitments.’[19] Hence, there is a direct correlation between the framework we adopt and the value judgments that it implies, the built in value slope that it represents. Any certain framework is commited to a normative view and to a conception of the human needs, purposes, goals, and alike. Assuming a certain approach requires to assume its consequences on the outcomes and we cannot forget that a reason (to adopt a certain framework for example) is always a reason-for-somebody, a somebody who finds it a reason for him since he has accepted the implied values in it. Moreover, explanatory frameworks applied to society or politics secrete a notion of good and not only a value slope and this values and notions cannot be overridden without removing the explanatory framework as well. Once again we see that there is no single method which like in physics can lead the sociologists or political scholars to the neutral, dispassionate and value free study of their subject matter. We cannot predict and we cannot easily prove anything in these realms. And even if we could, our predictions would be so limited in their scope and extension that we could never pretend them to reach the level of generality and objectivity that science requires from its findings and for its purposes, we cannot claim to have the kind of knowledge that science is supposed to yield.
There is therefore no way for us to approach the social and/or political phenomena from a pure scientific and therefore value free and detached perspective. There is no way to ‘step outside our community long enough to examine it in the light of something which trascends it, namely, that which it has in common with every other actual and possible human community.’[20] There is no reality without understanding and without language but these two are context dependant once again. There are in other words no essences waiting to be discovered or rediscovered and to think so is to seek comfort in the illusory idea that human history has a path to follow in which it developes itself into something superior overcoming the distinction between the natural and the social, that would be in terms of Rorty, to exhibit a kind of solidarity which would then not be parochial because it would be the expression of an ahistorical human nature.[21] Such a nature does not exist. The rules of rationality are then not being given from the outside but are defined by the local cultural norms of the social phenomenon we study and these are the ones we have to apply. There is a feedback so to say between the observer and the observed unlike in the natural sciences where the phenomena are presented to the scientist in an immediate relation for him to study.
The study of the social and/or the political is a philosophical activity in the form of a discussion of terms, concepts, ideas and principles. When we study them we have to approach them from a historic point of view, taking into account what the agents meant or intended to mean and the way in which they understood what they were doing. Whether one does so by the use of a rational, historical, geistesgeschichtliche or intellectual reconstruction will obviously make a difference in the nature of our results[22] since as we have seen, the choice of a certain theoretical framework impacts on the methodology we deploy to study the phenomenon we want to analyze as well as on the spectrum of relevant elements that we will consider in our study and most importantly, it makes us assume a position from inside a certain value slope, neutrality vanishes and we take positions and eliminate possibilities. We can always commit anachronisms, parochialisms, historical absurdities, we can correct authors and utterances or may be not but we are like Skinner says, definitely and unavoidably set in approaching any given writer or author by the characteristics of the discipline to which he is said to have contributed.[23]
When we discuss politics we engage in politics, we are defining what counts as political and what does not but the language we use, contrary to what one would believe is of the same kind as the one which is used by the agents we intend to analyze, we engage in a debate with them and shape value principles, assumptions, terms, concepts and ideas. Specifically in politics more than in any other branch of the social those concepts are contested ones for disagreement is an element inherent to the political. There are no perennial questions, there are just the questions that we in our tradition have to face and answer, there is no uniformity to be found, everyone has a position which is not only context biased but his activity is of a kind that it engages in the disagreement, it cannot be neutral, it cannot be detached. Political agents use concepts which are inherently contested or with a built in contestability. Concepts which like Gallie says[24], are appraisive, variously describable, open in character and which are used both defensively and aggressively. Moreover, these concepts seem to be derived from some kind of an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the users of the concept and the continuous competition between them for acknowledgement enables the said exemplar to be sustained or developed to its possible best. These concepts themselves and their sui generis use reflect the disagreement. The reality is shaped by language so there is nothing outside from us. A science of politics is therefore a chimeric thought. There are no law like generalizations to be made in society and therefore not in politics either, there is no unique method, no perennial questions to be solved, when we analyze the political we engage in the same activity as the agents we analyze, we take sides. The philosophy which we would require to apply in order to study the political would be political itself and there is no way out of that.
Bibliography
Gallie, W.B., (1956), Essentially Contested Concepts, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Harrison & Sons., London
Macintyre, Alasdair, (1971) in The Philosophy of Social Explanation, A. Ryan (ed.), (1973) Oxford University Press, London
Minogue Kenneth, Method in Intellectual History in Tully, J. (ed.) Meaning and Context, (distributed photocopies)
Rorty, Richard, (1984), The Historiography of Philosophy. Four Genres in Rorty, J.B. Schneewind and Skinner, Q. (eds.), Philosophy in history: essays on the historiography of philosophy Cambridge University Press
----------, (2002) Solidarity or Objectivity? in Cahoone, L. (ed.) From Modernism to Postmodernism, Oxford, Blackwell
Skinner, Q., Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas in Tully, J. (ed.) Meaning and Context, (distributed photocopies)
Taylor, Charles (1967) Neutrality in Political Science in The Philosophy of Social Explanation, A. Ryan (ed.), (1973) Oxford University Press, London, p. 140
----------, (1981) Understanding and Explanation in the Geisteswissenschaften in Wittgenstein: To follow a rule, S.H. Holtzmann and C.M. Leich (ed.) Routledge, London
Winch, Peter (1958), The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, second edition, Routledge, London
[1] See Winch, Peter (1958), The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, second edition, Routledge, London, p. xi
[2] Cfr. Íbid., p. xiii
[3] See, Íbid., p. 3
[4] See, Íbid., p. 3-6
[5] See, Íbid., pp. 42-44
[6] See Taylor, Charles (1967) Neutrality in Political Science in The Philosophy of Social Explanation, A. Ryan (ed.), (1973) Oxford University Press, London, p. 140
[7] See, Taylor, Charles (1981) Understanding and Explanation in the Geisteswissenschaften in Wittgenstein: To follow a rule, S.H. Holtzmann and C.M. Leich (ed.) Routledge, London, p. 191
[8] Winch, Peter, Op. Cit., pp.91-93
[9] See, Macintyre, Alasdair, (1971) in The Philosophy of Social Explanation, A. Ryan (ed.), (1973) Oxford University Press, London, p. 172
[10] See Íbid., p. 174
[11] See Íbid., p. 178
[12] See Taylor, Charles (1981) Op Cit., pp. 192-193
[13] See, Ídem., pp. 194-197
[14] See, Ídem., pp. 198-199
[15] Ídem., p. 201
[16] Ídem., p. 202
[17] See Minogue Kenneth, Method in Intellectual History in Tully, J. (ed.) Meaning and Context, p.187 (distributed photocopies)
[18] See, Taylor, Charles (1967) Op. Cit., p. 150
[19] See Macintyre, Alasdair, Op.Cit., p. 188
[20] Rorty, Richard, (2002) Solidarity or Objectivity? in Cahoone, L. (ed.) From Modernism to Postmodernism, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 448
[21] Ídem.Rorty uses solidarity in opposition to objectivity implying that in the former we look forward to give sense to our lives by placing them in a larger context, that of a community which is obviously context biased.
[22] See Rorty, Richard, (1984), The Historiography of Philosophy. Four Genres in Rorty, J.B. Schneewind and Skinner, Q. (eds.), Philosophy in history: essays on the historiography of philosophy Cambridge University Press, pp-49-68
[23] Skinner, Q., Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas in Tully, J. (ed.) Meaning and Context, p. 43 (distributed photocopies)
[24] Gallie, W.B., (1956), Essentially Contested Concepts,in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Harrison & Sons., London, p. 171-180.
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